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Abstract in English 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, a group of countries commit themselves to reduce the emissions of 
greenhouse gases to some 5% below the 1990 level. Countries can decide to spread their 
reduction commitment over several gases to lower compliance costs. Employing a multi-gas 
strategy can offer considerable efficiency gains because of the widely diverging marginal 
abatement cost for the different emission sources. In this Discussion Paper, the analysis of 
climate policy for the most important greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide, is extended with two 
other important greenhouse gases, methane and nitrous oxide. The multi-region and multi-
sector Applied General Equilibrium model WorldScan has been used as an instrument for 
addressing this issue. The approach presented is consistent with the bottom-up information on 
reduction possibilities for those non-CO2 greenhouse gases while it allows for general 
equilibrium effects and intergas interactions. Including non-CO2 greenhouse gases into the 
analysis has important sectoral impacts while the regional effects are limited. A considerable 
part of the burden on gas, coal and oil products will be shifted to the agricultural sectors. 
Reductions of non-CO2 gases could be especially important for countries like China and India.  
Key words: Climate policy, non-CO2 gases, Applied General Equilibrium Model 
Abstract in Dutch 
Een groep landen heeft zich in het Kyoto-protocol verplicht de emissies van broeikasgassen te 
reduceren tot ongeveer 5% onder het niveau van 1990. Landen kunnen hun reductie-inspanning 
spreiden over diverse gassen om de bijbehorende kosten te verlagen. Het toepassen van een 
multi-gas-strategie biedt een aanzienlijke efficiëntiewinst door de grote verschillen in marginale 
reductiekosten van de diverse emissiebronnen. In dit Discussion Paper wordt de analyse van 
klimaatbeleid voor alleen het belangrijkste broeikasgas, kooldioxide, uitgebreid met twee 
andere belangrijke broeikasgassen, methaan en distikstofoxide (lachgas). Het multi-regio- en 
multi-sector toegepast algemeen evenwichtsmodel (WorldScan) is hierbij als 
onderzoeksinstrument gebruikt. De gepresenteerde benadering is consistent met bottom-up 
informatie over deze niet-CO2-broeikasgassen, terwijl het algemeen evenwichtseffecten en 
interacties tussen gassen toestaat. Het opnemen van niet-CO2-broeikasgassen in de analyse heeft 
belangrijke sectorale gevolgen, terwijl de regionale effecten beperkt blijven. Een aanzienlijk 
deel van de lastendruk op gas, kolen en olie wordt verschoven naar de landbouwsectoren. 
Reductie van niet-CO2-gassen zou vooral belangrijk kunnen zijn voor landen als China en India. 
 
Steekwoorden: klimaatbeleid, niet-CO2-gassen, Toegepast Algemeen Evenwichtsmodel 
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Summary 
The Kyoto Protocol (1997) commits a group of industrialised countries to reduce their 
emissions of greenhouse gases in 2008-2012 to approximately 5% below their 1990 levels. 
Countries can decide to spread their reduction commitment over several gases to lower the 
compliance costs. Spreading the reductions over multiple gases may have a considerable impact 
on the economic costs of compliance, even though the non-CO2 gases are only responsible for a 
relatively small share of total emissions. Most importantly, the widely diverging marginal 
abatement costs of the gases offer the potential for realising considerable efficiency gains. This 
Discussion Paper presents the results of incorporating methane and nitrous oxide in a multi-
region and multi-sector applied general equilibrium model (WorldScan). The approach 
presented is consistent with bottom-up information on reduction possibilities for those non-CO2 
greenhouse gases, while it allows for general equilibrium effects and inter-gas interactions. 
Most applied general equilibrium models for climate policies only use a rule of thumb for 
emission reductions of non-CO2 gases. 
The results show that non-CO2 abatement can lower costs substantially for all regions, although 
the magnitude of this cost reduction varies over regions. For the members of EU-15, the USA 
and other OECD countries, the share of non-CO2 gases in total reduction is modest and declines 
rapidly at higher prices, so that there is a smaller role for non-CO2 gases at higher emission 
prices. However, the sectoral effects of employing a multi-gas strategy are considerable at low 
prices. Part of the burden on gas, coal and oil products has now been shifted to the agricultural 
sectors. Reductions of non-CO2 gases could be especially important for countries like China and 
India if they would participate in international climate policy.  
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1  Introduction
1 
The Kyoto Protocol (1997) commits a group of industrialised countries—the Annex-B 
countries
2— to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases in 2008-2012 to approximately 5% 
below their 1990 levels. Compared to a reference scenario without climate policy, the reduction 
is much larger than this 5%, however. Emissions have grown in most countries since 1990, and 
will continue to do so without additional policy measures. This sizeable reduction has raised 
concern about the associated economic costs. Fortunately, the Protocol contains a number of 
flexibility mechanisms to lower the costs of compliance. One of these is the ‘what-
flexibility’
3— the possibility of spreading the reduction commitments over multiple gases such 
as carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) and a group of fluorinated gases.  
Most economic analyses deal only with CO2 emission reductions, but interest in non-CO2 
greenhouse gases is growing. Even though non-CO2 greenhouse gases are responsible for only 
28% of the Kyoto gas emissions measured in CO2-equivalents,
4 their inclusion in the 
calculations may have a considerable impact on the economic costs of compliance: the widely 
diverging marginal abatement costs of the gases offer the potential for realising considerable 
efficiency gains. Previous studies have estimated the cost savings of a multi-gas strategy 
compared to a CO2- only policy to be more than proportional to the emission contributions of 
the non-CO2 greenhouse gases (Hayhoe et al., 1999; Manne and Richels, 2001; Reilly et al., 
1999; Reilly et al., 2003, Hyman et al., 2002). In most of these studies, the non-CO2 greenhouse 
gases are incorporated in the model through exogenous marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves, 
derived from bottom-up analyses.
5 The MAC-curves show the cost of abating the next 
incremental ton of greenhouse gas for each level of overall abatement. A MAC-curve is derived 
by ordering abatement opportunities by cost from low to high, and plotting the total abatement 
volume of each option. 
An important disadvantage of using exogenous MAC-curves is their inability to capture 
inter-gas interactions. For instance, several methane sources are linked to energy use, so that a 
tax on fossil fuels will also bring down methane emissions. Moreover, employing exogenous 
MAC-curves also neglects general equilibrium effects, such as the impact on import and export 
 
1 The authors thank the RIVM (The National Institute of Public Health and the Environment), and especially Bas Eickhout, 
Detlef van Vuuren en Michel den Elzen for fruitful discussions and for access to their data. Moreover, they thank George 
Gelauff, Theo van de Klundert, Arjan Lejour, Ton Manders, Paul Tang and Paul Veenendaal for helpful comments and 
suggestions. 
2 The Annex I or Annex B group consists of Western and Eastern Europe, the USA, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand 
and the former Soviet Union (the USA and Australia have decided not to ratify the Protocol, however). The Annex B group 
can thus roughly be identified with the industrialised countries and the countries in transition; the non-Annex B group 
consists of the developing countries. 
3 The other flexibility mechanisms are when-flexibility and where-flexibility. When-flexibility relates to the timing of reductions 
(in the 2008-2012 period). Where-flexibility means that countries can accomplish part of their reduction abroad, through 
emission trading or setting up reduction projects in other countries (via Joint Implementation or the Clean Development 
Mechanism). 
4 For an explanation of the unit for measuring emission volumes, see the Box on page 10. 
5 Notable exceptions are Manne and Richels (2001) and Hyman et al. (2002).   10 
prices, effects on terms of trade and on the investment in and depletion of fossil fuel resources. 
Finally, welfare analysis is not possible in a partial equilibrium approach. The economic costs 
measured as the area under a partial equilibrium MAC-curve are not consistent with equivalent 
variation, the welfare measure that is commonly used in assessing policy costs.  
Measuring greenhouse gas emissions 
The Kyoto Protocol covers six different greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) 
and three F-gases (HFC, PFC and SF6). The emission targets in the Kyoto protocol apply to the aggregate of these six 
gases. These gases differ in their Global Warming Potential (GWP), i.e. their effect on radiative forcing. The GWP of a 
greenhouse gas is defined as the ratio of the cumulative radiative forcing that would result from the emissions of one 
kilogram of that gas to that from emission of one kilogram of carbon dioxide over a period of time (usually 100 years). 
The table below (derived from Jensen et al., 2001) presents the GWPs of the different gases. 
Emission volumes are thus commonly expressed in carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2-equivalents): the metric volume 
times the GWP. For instance, the emission of 1 ton of methane has the same impact on radiative forcing as 21 ton of 
CO2. Carbon dioxide equivalents can easily be converted to carbon equivalents (Ceq) by multiplying the carbon dioxide 
equivalents by 12/44 (the ratio of the molecular weight of carbon to carbon dioxide). 
 
Table: Kyoto greenhouse gases, Global Warming Potential and main emission sources 
Greenhouse gas  GWP  Emission sources 
     
CO2  1  Combustion of fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas) 
CH4  21  Cattle and manure, rice, natural gas, waste and fuel losses/leakage 
N2O  310  Agricultural soils, fertilizer and industrial production (adipic and nitric acid) 
HFCs
a  140-11700  Air conditioning and foam blowing 
PFCs
a  6200-9200  Aluminium and semiconductors 
SF6  23900  Magnesium, semiconductors and electrical switchgear 
 
a




For these reasons, we have incorporated the abatement of methane and nitrous oxide as an 
endogenous component in the multi-region and multi-sector Applied General Equilibrium 
(AGE) model WorldScan (CPB, 1999).
6 In this paper, we investigate the impact of including 
these gases in the analysis in addition to CO2-emissions from fossil fuel combustion. The key 
feature of our approach is that abatement of non-CO2 greenhouse gases implies a loss of 
productivity: resources have to be diverted to abatement (cf. Hyman et al., 2002; Copeland and 
Taylor, 2003). The association of a productivity loss with abatement makes that the MAC-
curves are endogenously generated in our model. The difference between our approach and 
models in which MAC-curves are exogenous, is that in our approach, the full general 
equilibrium effects are taken into account, as the abatement costs are part of the firm’s 
optimisation problem. A firm can choose to abate emissions to avoid paying a tax on these 
emissions, but this comes at the cost of reduced productivity, as resources have to be diverted to 
 
6 The so-called F-gases are not incorporated as their volume is negligibly small.   11 
abatement. Alternatively, the firm can choose not to abate at all, paying the full emission tax. In 
general, there will be an interior optimum. The bottom-up MAC-curve of the non-CO2 
greenhouse gases implicitly determines this optimum. Hence, our approach is consistent with 
bottom-up information, while it allows for general equilibrium effects and inter-gas 
interactions.  
In the analysis, we focus on the general equilibrium marginal abatement cost curves, as 
these indicate the cost-saving potential of including non-CO2 greenhouse gases in climate 
policy. With this focus in mind, we perform two types of analyses. First, we decompose the 
change in the MAC-curves in different general equilibrium effects. Subsequently, we compare 
the costs of a multi-gas strategy to the costs of a CO2-only approach.  
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we will first discuss the emissions in the 
baseline scenario, focusing on the importance of non-CO2 gases in different regions and for 
different sectors. This gives a first indication of the effects of extending climate policy to non-
CO2 gases. In Section 3, we discuss the modelling of non-CO2 gases in WorldScan, with special 
emphasis on the effect of abatement on productivity. The results are presented in Section 4. 
Section 5 concludes.   12   13 
2  Emissions 
2.1  Baseline scenario 
In the reference or baseline scenario it is assumed that no climate policy measures are applied 
other than the current measures; it is a so-called Business-as-Usual (BaU) scenario. The impact 
of climate policy such as the effect on GDP and sectoral structure can then be determined by 
comparing the results from the baseline scenario to the results of a scenario in which new 
measures are initiated. The baseline scenario is thus used as a benchmark. 
The choice of baseline scenario is not neutral, as its characteristics have an important effect 
on the estimated costs of climate policy. Firstly, the baseline emissions set the reduction 
volume, which is defined relative to 1990 emissions. Moreover, in a baseline scenario with high 
(low) economic growth, costs will be higher (lower). Also the sectoral composition, 
technological change and demographic developments will have an effect on the costs of climate 
policy. 
Our baseline scenario is built up from several partial scenarios, each providing 
complementary information. The economic developments and the CO2-emission projections are 
taken from a version of the ‘Strong Europe’ scenario (CPB, 2003). In addition, projections for 
the regional emission factors of the non-CO2 gases to predict future emission intensities are 
taken from the A1B scenario of the IMAGE SRES scenarios (RIVM, 2001). The A1B scenario 
is consistent with the ‘Strong Europe’ scenario of CPB (2003).
7 This A1B scenario describes a 
world with increasing globalisation, rapid technological progress, and high economic growth. 
Finally, the projections of non-CO2 greenhouse gases for the individual EU-countries stem from 
the Sectoral Objectives Study (Capros, Kouvaritakis and Mantzos, 2001; Hendriks et al., 2001).  
Table 2.1 and 2.2show the composition of non-CO2 emissions in several regions. The non-
CO2 greenhouse gases account for a considerable share in total emissions, ranging from roughly 
15% in the USA, the Rest of OECD and the EU-15 countries to even 40% in Latin America. 
The sectoral composition of the emissions varies greatly over regions. Firstly, emissions from 
rice cultivation are only important in the WorldScan region Rest of World. Also the share of 
emissions from the production of nitric and adipic acid varies strongly over regions. Despite its 
modest contribution to total emissions, the production of nitric and adipic acid is an important 
emission source, because of its large reduction potential at low costs, as will be discussed 
below. Thirdly, the share of emissions from leakages in energy production differs considerably 
among regions. Also for this source, there are substantial reduction possibilities at fairly low 
costs. We will come back to the possible implications of the sectoral composition of emissions 
in Section 2.3. 
 
 
7 Bollen et al. (2004) also used the ‘Strong Europe’ scenario, but they derived the energy and climate developments from the 
B1 scenario of IMAGE SRES.   14 
Table 2.1  Regional and sectoral composition of non-CO2 emissions (%) in WorldScan, 1997
a 



























                   
Livestock  30  42  22  30  53  33  82  43  43 
Paddy rice  1  0  1  0  5  3  2  24  11 
Leakages coal  25  7  6  37  6  0  1  11  11 
Leakages oil  3  1  4  1  2  12  4  1  3 
Leakages gas  23  7  62  11  17  41  3  3  15 
Fertilizer use  13  27  5  11  12  8  7  17  14 
Adipic and nitric acid  6  16  1  11  6  1  1  1  3 
                   
Non-CO2 gases  14  14  25  20  13  22  41  31  23 
  a
 The share of the different sources is calculated relative to the total non-CO2 emissions of non-CO2 sources (weighted by their GWP) 
included in the model; the share of non-CO2 gases is defined relative to the sum of the non-CO2 and CO2 emissions. 
Source: WorldScan based on RIVM (2001). 
 























                 
Livestock  38  40  29  44  43  39  54  61 
Paddy rice  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  1 
Leakages coal  13  2  12  12  6  6  4  1 
Leakages oil  1  0  1  1  0  1  0  0 
Leakages gas  11  2  11  11  5  6  3  1 
Fertilizer use  20  37  24  27  31  16  17  33 
Adipic and nitric acid  17  19  22  5  14  32  21  3 
                 
Non-CO2 gases  11  24  14  17  11  15  9  15 
  a 
The share of the different sources is calculated relative to the total non-CO2 emissions of non-CO2 sources (weighted by their GWP) 
included in the model; the share of non-CO2 gases is defined relative to the sum of the non-CO2 and CO2 emissions. 
b
 Including Luxembourg. 
Source: Capros et al. (2001) and Hendriks et al. (2001). 
 
2.2  Emissions: activity and emission intensity 
The volume of greenhouse gas emissions depends on two distinct components: the production 
level and the emission intensity, i.e. the emissions per unit of output. Emissions are thus, by 
definition, the product of the activity level of the emission source and the emission factor: 
t r s
F
t r s t r s Q E E , , , , , , × =   (2.1) 
   15 
with E the emission volume, E
F the emission coefficient or emission factor and Q the activity 
level of the emission source. The subscripts s, r and t refer to the emission source, region and 
time, respectively. Emission factors differ among regions, as regions differ in their production 
technologies and their input mix. Similarly, within a region, emission factors can change over 
time, as technologies develop and different inputs are used. These remarks hold both for CO2 
and for the non-CO2 gases alike. However, for CO2, the change in emission factor is modelled 
by explicitly modelling the input of different fuels, each with their own emission intensity. For 
non-CO2, the emission intensity is influenced by a myriad of factors. For instance, emissions 
from paddy rice are influenced by nutrients, cultivar type and irrigation method (see e.g. 
Burniaux, 2000). It is not possible to model all these factors in WorldScan, also because of data 
problems. Therefore, we use the emission factor as a ‘catchall’ variable.  
The emission factor may change in the baseline scenario without newly imposed climate 
policy measures This change in emission factor in the baseline is called Autonomous Emission 
Efficiency Improvement; this mechanism will be discussed in Section 2.2.1. If the emission 
factor changes as a result of climate policy, it is called Induced Technological Change. This 
mechanism is discussed in Section 2.2.2. 
2.2.1  Baseline: Autonomous Emission Efficiency Improvement 
In the baseline, the emission coefficient may vary over time as a result of technological 
developments or a change in input mix. For instance, farmers may decide to increase the share 
of sheep in their herd at the expense of cows, thus affecting the emission coefficient of 
livestock-related sources. These changes are not prompted by some desire to decrease emissions 
but stem from other considerations, such as technological developments, cost reduction and 
changes in lifestyle. When the emission coefficient decreases as a result of such ’autonomous’ 
changes, this is called Autonomous Emission Efficiency Improvement (AEEI).  
The change in emission factor in the baseline scenario has been derived from the emission 
volume and the corresponding activity levels from the IMAGE SRES scenarios (RIVM, 2001).
8 




8 There are small differences in the definition of WorldScan and IMAGE 2.2 emissions sources, causing some error in the 
estimates of WorldScan emission factors, but these errors are likely to be small. For the European countries, there is an 
additional source of error. As the Sectoral Objectives Studies do not include information on activity levels, we have used the 
data for the aggregated European Union from the IMAGE SRES scenarios as a proxy for the economic developments in the 
individual European countries. This introduces two types of error. First of all, it is of course not justified to use ‘toto pro pars’: 
the economic developments in the individual countries will differ from the overall average. Furthermore, the scenarios 
employed in the Sectoral Objectives Study are not the same as the scenarios underlying the IMAGE emission projections. 
However, the emission factors calculated on the basis of these data look quite reasonable.   16 
Table 2.3  Emission factor in 2010 (1997 = 100; world average) 
  Baseline emission factor  
   
Livestock  74.2 
Paddy rice  85.5 
Leakage coal  81.6 
Leakage gas  87.5 
Leakage oil  97.9 
Fertilizer use  100.5 
Adipic and nitric acid   44.2 
 
Source: WorldScan calculations on the basis of RIVM (2001). 
 
Generally, the emission factors fall steadily over time. It should be noted that the global 
averages in Table 2.3 hide some important regional differences. For instance, the emission 
factor from the adipic and nitric acid production falls to 27 in the USA in 2010, whereas it stays 
relatively high at 96 for Latin America. This reflects differences in production technologies, 
abatement options, environmental policies and many other factors. 
Table 2.4 shows the combined effect of the change in emission factor and in activity level 
on the emission volume for the various sources. This decomposition shows the importance of 
the variable emission factor in determining the emission volume. The change in emission factor 
can either compensate for or reinforce the change in activity level. Often, the emission intensity 
as measured by the emission factor falls, while sector output expands. The net effect on 
emissions depends on the relative magnitude of those effects. Generally, the emission volume 
rises in the baseline. This is in particular the case for emissions from fertilizer use, paddy rice, 
oil leakage and gas leakage. 
Table 2.4  Decomposition of the global changes in emission volume in % per year for the baseline 
scenario (1997-2010) 
  Emission factor   Activity level  Emission volume 
Methane sources       
Livestock   - 2.3  2.8  0.5 
Paddy rice   - 1.2  2.8  1.6 
Leakage coal   - 1.5  0.0  - 1,5 
Leakage oil  - 0.2  1.6  1.5 
Leakage gas  - 1.0  2.5  1.5 
       
Nitrous oxide sources       
Fertilizer use (N2O)  0.0  4.5  4.5 
Adipic and nitric acid (N2O)  - 6.1  4.6  - 1.5 
 
Source: WorldScan calculations on the basis of RIVM (2001). 
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2.2.2  Climate policy: Induced Technological Change 
The emission factor may also fall as a result of climate policy. In that case, a tax on emissions 
induces firms to alter their production technology such that the emissions per unit of output fall. 
Of course, these reductions generally do not come for free. For instance, rice producers have to 
invest in new irrigation systems (intermittent irrigation) to lower methane emissions per unit of 
output. The information on abatement options and their costs is summarised in so-called 
Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) curves. An important parameter for describing the MAC-
curves is the reduction potential, i.e. the technical limit to the share of the emissions that can be 
abated. This variable is presented in Table 2.5 for several sources and regions. The MAC-
curves themselves are presented in Appendix A and explained in detail in 3.1.1. The reduction 
potential in the livestock sector is set to zero, even though there are indications that there is a 
positive reduction potential (see e.g. Burniaux, 2000). However, the data are not very accurate. 
Furthermore, the reduction potential in the livestock sector is only positive for emissions from 
manure, which only make up 7% of total livestock emissions.  
For all sources, except for leakages from gas production and distribution, the MAC-curves 
show that the reduction potential is already reached at fairly low emission taxes. This implies 
that reductions up to the reduction potential are generally cheap for non-CO2 gases. The 
reduction potentials are often substantial. Especially for N2O-emissions from adipic and nitric 
acid, the reduction potential is large: almost all emissions can be eliminated at virtually no 
costs. Also for emissions from losses and leakages from coal mining, oil production and gas 
production and distribution, the reduction potential is large.  


















                 
Livestock
a
  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Paddy rice  57  57  57  57  57  57  57  57 
Leakages coal  88  52  61  73  76  86  100  80 
Leakages oil  21  100  38  100  29  43  35  32 
Leakages gas  56  49  43  100  55  60  59  53 
Adipic and nitric acid  92  92  100  92  92  100  100  93 
                  a
 The positive reduction potential for manure is ignored, as its emissions only constitute a minor fraction of total livestock emissions. 
Source: EPA (2003), Brown et al. (1999) 
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2.3  Scope for non-CO2 greenhouse gases 
In most economic analyses of climate policy, only CO2-emissions are considered. In that case, it 
is implicitly assumed that non-CO2 greenhouse gases are reduced by the same relative amount 
as CO2 , although no costs are attached to the reduction of non-CO2 gases. By contrast, this 
paper focuses on the gains from what-flexibility, i.e. the difference in abatement costs when the 
emissions of all greenhouse gases are taxed and when only CO2-emissions are taxed for a given 
emission target. Since non-CO2 gases offer additional reduction options that are sometimes less 
expensive than the options involving the reduction of CO2, the costs of a multi-gas strategy will 
be equal to or lower than a strategy in which only CO2-emissions are abated.  
However, the reduction potential and the reduction costs differ per emission source, so that 
the composition of the total emission volume is an important determinant of the abatement costs 
in a region. Hence, the effect of a multi-gas strategy is expected to vary by region, as the 
composition of the emission volume depends on the fundamental structure of the economy. 
Section 2.1 and 2.2 give a first indication of the importance of non-CO2 greenhouse gases in 
different regions. Table 2.1, 2.2 and 2.5 suggest that all regions can gain by employing a multi-
gas strategy, though to differing degrees. For the non-Annex B regions, the share of non-CO2 
emissions is generally high, while for the industrialised countries the share of emission sources 
with low abatement costs is fairly high.  
For all regions, the scope for reduction by abating emissions from leakages in gas 
production and distribution is considerable. For instance, in the former Soviet Union where 
emissions from leakages in gas production and distribution account for 56% of total non-CO2 
emissions, almost 35% of the emission volume from this source can be abated at 100 dollar per 
ton carbon equivalent. For all regions, both the reduction potential and the share in total 
emissions are considerable for this source. 
While reducing emissions from gas leakage and production is important for all regions, 
there are also emission sources that are especially important for a selection of regions. 
Emissions from adipic and nitric acid production are particularly important for European 
countries, because of their huge reduction potential at almost zero cost and their substantial 
share in emissions in these countries.   19 
3  Non-CO2 greenhouse gases in WorldScan 
3.1  WorldScan 
To determine the economic impact of including non-CO2 greenhouse gases in climate policy, 
the non-CO2 emission sources have been incorporated in the applied general equilibrium (AGE) 
model WorldScan. More information on this model can be found in the box below and in CPB 
(1999).  
WorldScan in a nutshell 
WorldScan  (CPB,  1999)  is  a  multi-sector,  multi-region  Applied  General  Equilibrium  (AGE)  model.  The  model  is 
developed to study long-term global issues, such as globalisation and climate change policy. The model builds upon 
neoclassical theory, has strong micro-foundations and solves for the equilibrium that maximises welfare across the 
entire economy, subject to technological constraints, greenhouse gas limitations, etc. The model is calibrated on input-
output tables and trade data from the GTAP5 database (Dimaranan and McDougall, 2002). The base year for the model 
is 1997. Production sectors use capital, labour, natural resources and intermediate inputs (including energy) to produce 
output. Production technologies are described by nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functions. 
The version used in this study distinguishes 15 sectors and 16 regions. These are listed in the table below. The model 
thus contains considerable detail at the European level. Also the energy sectors are modelled in considerable detail. 
The sectoral and regional classification is the same as in CPB (2003), except that the agricultural sector is split in three 
separate sub sectors (livestock, paddy rice, other agriculture), while the sector ‘energy intensive products’ is split in two 
(chemical, rubber and plastic products and other energy intensive sectors) to host several non-CO2 emission sources. 
 
Sectors and regions in WorldScan 
Sectors  Regions 
   
Livestock  Germany  
Paddy rice  France  
Agriculture nec
a
  United Kingdom  
Coal  The Netherlands 
Oil  Belgium and Luxembourg 
Natural gas and gas distribution  Italy  
Minerals nec
a
  Spain  
Chemical, rubber and plastic products  Rest of European Union 
Petroleum and coal products  Eastern Europe  
Other energy intensive sectors  Former Soviet Union 
Consumer good sector  Turkey  
Capital goods and durables  United states  
Electricity  Rest OECD 
Other services  Latin America and Mexico 
Transport  Middle East and Northern Africa 
   Rest of world 
    a
 Nec: not elsewhere classified.   
   20 
In the WorldScan model, emissions are coupled to production and consumption levels. For CO2, 
the emissions follow from the energy input into production and consumption. Carbon dioxide 
emissions are coupled proportionally to the burning of fossil fuels.
9 As in the case of CO2, 
emissions from non-CO2 gases stem from inputs in the production process. However, because 
the emission intensity of non-CO2 emission sources depends on many factors, the dependence 
of emissions on inputs is not modelled explicitly. Instead, the non-CO2 emissions are modelled 
by employing a variable emission factor (per source), linking emissions to output volume
10  
The activities to which the non-CO2 emission sources are linked in WorldScan are given in 
Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1  Non-CO2 emission sources and corresponding WorldScan sectors 
Emission source  WorldScan sector/activity 
   
Paddy rice  Rice cultivation 
Manure, enteric fermentation and animal waste  Livestock 
Losses in coal production and transport  Coal production 
Losses/leakage in oil production and transport  Oil production 
Losses/leakage in gas production and distribution  Gas production and distribution 
Fertilizer use  Inputs of chemicals in agricultural sectors 
Production of adipic and nitric acid  Production of chemicals 
 
 In this study, we have allowed for abatement through ITC for the following sources:
11  
 
·  Paddy rice 
·  Losses and leakages coal mining 
·  Losses and leakages oil recovery 
·  Losses and leakages gas recovery 
·  Production of adipic and nitric acid 
·  Fertilizer use 
 




8 For more information on the modeling of CO2 emissions in WorldScan, see Bollen et al. (2002). 
10 There is one exception to this way of modeling emissions of non-CO2 greenhouse gases. Emissions from fertilizer use are 
treated similar to CO2 emissions, i.e. emissions are in fixed proportion to fertilizer input in agricultural sectors, and are not 
linked to any output level. 
11 The emissions per unit of output cannot be reduced for all emission sources. Moreover, for some sources, there are no 
reliable data available. For these sources, abatement is accomplished solely by demand shifts. For instance, while it is 
possible to reduce emissions from enteric fermentation, the estimates widely vary (Burniaux (2000) reports reduction 
potentials ranging from 5 to 60%). For that reason, abatement options for enteric fermentation are not considered. Moreover, 
abatement options for manure are ignored, as the data are inaccurate and manure emissions only make up 7% of the global 
livestock emissions.    21 
3.2  Climate policy 
Both for CO2 and for the non-CO2 greenhouse gases, emission reductions are attained by 
imposing an emission price or emission tax on polluting activities. This has an effect on both 
the activity level of production (output) and on the emission intensity (emission factor). The 
imposition of an emission tax results in higher user prices. In the production process, inputs 
with low emission intensity will be substituted for inputs with high emission intensity. In 
addition, the demand for emission-intensive products will fall.  
There are several ways to endogenise pollution control for non-CO2 greenhouse gases, 
which are summarised in the box below. In our model, actors can choose between paying an 
emission tax and abating the emissions. Emission abatement comes at some cost, however, as 
resources have to be diverted to abatement. The optimal mix is thus determined by the 
particular MAC-curve. 
How to model non-CO2 abatement? 
Non-CO2 abatement can be modelled in several ways. One option is to include an abatement sector in the model. The 
abatement  sector  employs  capital,  labour  and  intermediate  inputs  to  reduce  emissions.  This  approach  allows  for 
flexibility in the factor shares of various abatement activities. A disadvantage of this approach, however, is that many 
abatement sectors would need to be modelled, as there are multiple abatement technologies for the different gases. 
Moreover, this method requires detailed data on the abatement technologies, which is currently not available in the form 
suitable for an AGE-model such as WorldScan.  
An alternative approach would be to allow for an alternative production process for e.g. rice that is less emission 
intensive than the original technology but comes at a higher cost, as resources have to be spent on pollution control. 
Again, the limitation of this approach is that there are many alternative production activities, each with its own emission 
intensity. This implies that a large number of production functions need to be introduced to represent the changes in 
production costs and emission intensity.  
A third approach is to model emissions as an input to the production, as in Hyman et al., 2002. While this approach is 
quite common in the analytical general equilibrium models (see e.g. Copeland and Taylor, 2002), there are some 
numerical problems when this approach is pursued in AGE modelling.
a
  
Here,  we  follow  a  more  direct,  though  similar  approach.  Emissions  are  modelled  in  the  traditional  way,  as  an 
undesirable output of production. Similar to Hyman et al., however, the fall in productivity associated with abatement is 
taken into account. Firms can thus choose between investing in pollution control (accepting a lower productivity) or 
paying higher emission taxes, as with CO2. Generally, it will be optimal to abate part of the emissions, paying the 
emission tax over the remainder. 
 
a
 The emission price function exhibits a discontinuity at P
E = 0.  
 
The marginal abatement costs from bottom-up MAC-curves are partial equilibrium prices. 
These MAC-curves can be used to calculate the general equilibrium marginal abatement costs 
in an AGE-model such as WorldScan. The partial equilibrium MAC-curves describe the scope 
for Induced Technological Change (ITC) in reducing greenhouse gas emissions.   22 
Abatement is achieved by lowering the emission intensity (emissions per unit of activity) of 
production. The emission factor thus declines with the imposition of an emission price. By 
definition it holds that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) E ITC A E E
F
E
F P r r P r with P r E P r E + = - × = , 1 ,  (3.1) 
with  F E the emission factor in the base year, and r the reduction as a function of the emission 
price PE. The reduction r is the sum of the reduction as a result of climate policy (rITC) and the 
autonomous reduction in the baseline (rA).  
However, emission reductions through ITC do not come for free. Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP) of sectors producing non-CO2 greenhouse gases will be lowered as a result of diverting 
part of the production of e.g. the livestock sector to emission abatement. The firm thus needs to 
decide which share of its resources to use for abatement. The optimum abatement level follows 
from profit maximisation.
12 Assuming that emissions are taxed at production, the profit of the 
firm becomes: 
( ) Q r E P Q c Q A p
F
E × - × × - × - × × = P 1 ,  (3.2) 
where p is the producer price, A denotes the productivity with A = 1 for rITC = 0, Q is the activity 
level, c is the marginal cost at this activity level, and PE is the emission price. We assume that 
productivity is a decreasing and concave function of the emission reduction rITC : the more 
resources are diverted to abatement, the less output is available for sale. The first order 
condition for the optimal reduction level reads: 
0 ' = × × + × × =
¶
P ¶





  (3.3) 
The firm chooses the optimal abatement level, maximising its profits. We assume free entry of 
firms and thus zero profits. Together with a postulated form for PE(rITC), Equations (3.2) and 
(3.3) yield a differential equation for the productivity A as a function of rITC. A particular simple 
parameterisation for rITC(PE) is: 









P r A E
E ITC d
e
  (3.4a) 
with the inverse function: 
 
12 More details on the derivation can be found in Appendix B.   23 
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with ε denoting the technical limit to the possible emission reduction, δ the speed of 
convergence , and rA the reduction through autonomous emission efficiency improvement. 
Hence, Equation (3.4) describes the partial equilibrium MAC-curve. With this parameterisation 
of the MAC-curve, we get the following expression for the total factor productivity: 
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with 
( ) ( ) ( ) ; 4 ; 1 ;
2 / 1 2 l e f s f l d f + - × × × = - - × = × = A A
F r c c r E    
and h a constant of integration following from the constraint A(0) = 1. Considering the relation 
between the parameters ε and the δ and the TFP-level gives some more insight in the 
implications of Equation (3.5). For a fixed emission price, the emission reduction will be larger 
for a larger ε or a smaller δ (see Equation (3.4)). Larger emission reductions will be associated 
with higher costs and thus a lower level of TFP. 
Figure 3.1 shows the fit of a particular bottom-up MAC-curve
13 (leakages from coal mining 
in the USA) based on Equation (3.4). Figure 3.2 shows the corresponding productivity function 
A. The MAC-curve and the productivity curves are thus convex and concave functions of the 
relative reduction r, respectively. The emission factor declines as a function of the emission 
price and approaches the minimum dictated by the MAC-curve for an emission price going to 
infinity. The two figures show that considerable emission reductions are already reached at 
fairly low prices, while TFP has only decreased by 3% at the reduction potential.  
 
13  All bottom-up MAC-curves are taken from the EPA (2003) (using the base energy price scenario, assuming a 5% 
discount rate and a zero tax rate), except for the MAC-curves for paddy rice and fertilizer use, which are taken from Brown 
et al. (1999).  
   24 
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Using the parameterisation of the MAC-curves, the model calculates the general equilibrium 
marginal abatement cost curves. These curves contain both effects of the imposition of an 
emission tax: (1) the decline of the emissions per unit of output and (2) the shift of demand to 
other products or to imports from countries with lower or no emission taxes. The fall in 
productivity leads to an increase in production costs. Firms can thus choose between paying the 
emission tax and investing in pollution control, accepting a lower productivity. In general, it 
will be optimal to abate part of the emissions, paying the emission tax over the remainder. The 
optimum is derived from the partial equilibrium MAC-curves. This approach thus integrates the 
bottom-up information from bottom-up MAC-curves with a general equilibrium approach. 
Our approach is similar to both that of Burniaux (2000) and Brown et al. (1999) in the use 
of an emission response function (Equation (3.4)). However, our model differs from their 
approaches in one important respect. Both Burniaux (2000) and Brown et al. (1999) attach no 
costs to this induced technological change. In our model, productivity falls if the reduction 
effort increases. This reflects deployment of resources for abatement. In this respect, our 
approach is similar to that of Hyman et al. (2002) and to that of Copeland and Taylor (2003), 
who model emissions as an input to production. In their formulation this leads to a difference 
between potential output and true output, i.e. productivity falls.  
Several points can be noted about the parameterisation of the MAC-curve. Firstly, the 
reductions from autonomous emission efficiency improvement (AEEI) have to be subtracted 
from the MAC-curves, as these options are no longer available. The specification (3.4) thus 
forces the MAC-curve to intersect the x-axis (P
E =0) at the point r = rA . As the reduction share 
through AEEI generally changes over time, the corresponding MAC-curve will also shift.  
Table 3.2 gives an indication of the importance of AEEI. For example, for the EU-15 only 
30% of the abatement options are left after subtracting the reduction volume accomplished by 
AEEI for the three major emission sources (leakages from coal and gas production and 
production of adipic and nitric acid). 


















                 
Paddy rice  64  65  88  78  101  88  66  74 
Leakages coal  94  33  71  102  57  42  113  65 
Leakages oil  173  49  88  88  145  58  129  89 
Leakages gas  98  28  93  56  94  66  87  114 
Adipic and nitric acid  21  36  56  62  24  70  96  84 
                 
   26 
This reduces the scope for reductions through Induced Technological Change in the long run. 
This is shown in Figure 3.3 for emissions from the production of nitric and adipic acid in the 
former Soviet Union. The figure shows how the MAC-curve shifts over time, as more and more 
options are exhausted under AEEI. Taking 1997 as a reference point, autonomous emission 
reductions increase from 0 to 0.384 in 2010 and 0.595 in 2020. 
Figure 3.3  Shift of MAC-curve of emissions from the production of nitric and adipic acid in the former Soviet 
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Secondly, several partial MAC-curves include negative cost abatement options.
14 Part of these 
reductions or even all can be consumed in the baseline, depending on the magnitude of the 
autonomous emission efficiency improvement. We assume positive costs for the no-regret 
options that are left after subtraction of the autonomous reductions. This reflects the view that 
the non-adoption of these techniques in the baseline indicates that the costs are positive in 
practice. An important reason is that transaction costs may not have been fully accounted for, so 
that abatement options with negative costs actually present net positive costs. Also, some actors 
may not be aware of the existence of negative cost options, as the returns are likely to be small 
in the baseline. Acquiring this information also represents a form of costs, which are in general 
not included in MAC-curves.  
A third issue is the emission reduction in the limit of an infinite emission price. There are 
two possible views. Our parameterisation assumes that even in the limit of infinite costs, only a 
fraction of the emissions can be abated. However, one could also argue that the introduction of 
 
14 Negative cost options denote that emission reductions go hand in hand with overall efficiency improvement, leading to 
negative net costs. A well-known example is the capture and sale of methane in natural gas production (EPA, 2001). It is 
commonly assumed that these ‘no regret’ options are not implemented in the absence of climate policy because of factors 
such as transaction costs and information problems.   27 
climate policy will stimulate the development of new abatement options, as in Hyman et al 
(2002).
15 At high enough emission prices, this will lead to more reduction options in the longer 
run. However, the course of the MAC-curve is then hard to predict, as also the curvature of the 
MAC-curves for lower emission prices is likely to change. Therefore, we have adopted the 
conservative approach, assuming a fixed reduction potential. For the short run, this seems to be 
a reasonable approach. 
Fourthly, an important parameter is the price elasticity of reduction through ITC, which is 
governed by the parameter δ.
16 For all sources, except for leakages from gas production and 
distribution, the reduction potential is already reached at fairly low emission taxes (a low value 
of δ). This implies that reductions up to the reduction potential are generally cheap for non-CO2 
gases. Equation (3.4) and Figure 3.3 show that with an increase in the autonomous emission 
efficiency index (rA), the abatement curve will fall below the curve of the base year. This 
reflects the intuition that abatement options generally will become cheaper over time.  
A final point is that, in our general equilibrium framework, there will be spillover effects 
between the different gases. For instance, when reducing CO2 in the coal sector, also methane 
emissions from coal production are reduced. The importance of these so-called co-benefits will 
be assessed in the next section.  
 
15 The bottom-up MAC-curves only use currently existing abatement technologies or technologies which are incremental 
improvements on current technologies.  
16 To be precise, the price elasticity of the ITC reduction is equal to δ / (δ + P
E).   28   29 
4  Results 
The focus of this study is twofold. Firstly, we want to assess the impact of general equilibrium 
effects on marginal abatement costs. Secondly, this study examines the scope of what-flexibility 
for cost reductions. For both purposes, the general equilibrium MAC-curves provide useful 
insights. In Section 4.1, the impact of general equilibrium effects on marginal abatement costs 
is explored. In Section 4.2, we look at the effect of employing a multi-gas strategy instead of a 
policy directed at CO2 only. 
4.1  Decomposition of the general equilibrium effects 
The previous section provides the building blocks for the decomposition of the general 
equilibrium effects. General equilibrium MAC-curves can be constructed by imposing different 
emission price levels for all regions and then determining the emission reductions.
17 We 
consider the year 2010, when the Kyoto Protocol is in full effect. We do not allow for emission 
trading, as we want to focus on the effect of what-flexibility in different regions separately. 
For the decomposition of the MAC-curves, we performed several simulations with the 
WorldScan model. The partial relation between the emission price and non-CO2 reduction is 
imposed a priori by Equation (3.4). In a first simulation we constructed a general equilibrium 
MAC-curve for CO2 by imposing an emission tax on CO2-emissions only. Also non-CO2 
emissions are reduced in that case, as a tax on CO2 may reduce output from sectors that also 
emit non-CO2 gases. These are the so-called co-benefits. In a second simulation, an emission 
price was imposed on non-CO2 gases only. This simulation gives us information about the 
general equilibrium MAC-curve of non-CO2 and the accompanying CO2 co-benefits. As a final 
experiment the emission tax was imposed on all greenhouse gases, leading to the full general 
equilibrium MAC-curve. 
Figure 4.1 and 4.2 present the cumulative MAC-curves for two different regions based on 
the simulations described above. Figure 4.1 shows the cumulative MAC-curves for the former 
Soviet Union, while Figure 4.2 presents these for the EU-15. The reason to focus on these two 
regions is that they represent the two extreme cases. For the former Soviet Union, general 
equilibrium effects are considerable, while these effects are only modest for the EU-15. General 
equilibrium effects in other regions are less pronounced than in the former Soviet Union, but 
stronger than for the EU-15. 
 The general equilibrium MAC-curve for all greenhouse gases can be decomposed into a 
part due to non-CO2 greenhouse gases (the area left from the non-CO2 general equilibrium 
curve) and a part due to CO2 (the area right from the non-CO2 general equilibrium curve). This 
general equilibrium MAC-curve for non-CO2 greenhouse gases can be further decomposed into 
 
17 We have considered the imposition of an emission price in all regions simultaneously. Alternatively, we could have 
imposed an emission price in a single country at the time. This will not change our results qualitatively.   30 
three components: co-benefits from CO2, a partial equilibrium effect and a general equilibrium 
effect. The first curve on the left represents these non-CO2 co-benefits resulting from an 
emission tax on CO2 only. The second line from the left shows the cumulative effect of these 
co-benefits and the partial non-CO2 MAC-curve. The area between the second and third MAC-
curve gives the general equilibrium effect, i.e. the emission reduction resulting from demand 
shifts due to higher producer prices. Thirdly, the general equilibrium MAC-curve for CO2 can 
be decomposed into CO2 co-benefits from an emission tax on non-CO2 and CO2 reductions 
resulting from general equilibrium effects of an emission tax on CO2.  
Figure 4.1 shows, that for the former Soviet Union the different components of the full 
general equilibrium MAC-curve all constitute a substantial share. For the former Soviet Union, 
the most important source of non-CO2 emissions is leakage from gas production and 
distribution, representing 62% of total non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions (Table 2.1). The 
reduction potential for this source is high: after correction for autonomous emission efficiency 
improvement the reduction potential is still 40% in 2010 (Table 3.2). In addition, even at higher 
emission prices, induced technological change offers several abatement options. Finally, the gas 
sector is also an important source of CO2-emissions, explaining the sizeable co-benefits. 
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Figure 4.2 shows the cumulative MAC-curve for the 15 EU-countries. In contrast with the 
former Soviet Union, the contribution of non-CO2 gases is negligible for the EU-15. There is 
only a modest demand shift for the non-CO2 greenhouse gases. Again, these results can be 
explained on the basis of the relative importance of non-CO2 gases and their marginal 
abatement costs. Table 2.1 shows that only 31% of the non-CO2 greenhouse gases in the EU-15 
are produced in sectors with a considerable reduction potential for induced technological   31 
change. For the remainder (emissions from livestock and fertilizer use), reductions have to 
come solely from demand shifts. Moreover, in the agricultural sectors the co-benefits obviously 
will be modest. Furthermore, Table 3.2 shows that after correction for AEEI in the baseline only 
one third of the ITC reduction potential is left. Therefore, the net reduction potential from 
induced technological change is modest, and it is completely depleted at low emission prices.  
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Figure 4.3 shows the importance of non-CO2 greenhouse gases in total abatement at different 
emission prices for the different regions. For all regions, the share of non-CO2 gases falls with 
higher emission prices . This shows that low-cost abatement options for non-CO2 gases are 
exhausted at intermediate emission prices. Non-CO2 greenhouse gases thus offer low-cost 
abatement options, lowering abatement costs, but once these options are exhausted, abatement 
has to come from CO2 again.  
However, as shown in the next section, abatement of non-CO2 gases can lower abatement 
costs substantially for all regions, although the size of the cost reduction varies over regions. 
For the former Soviet Union, the share of non-CO2 gases in total reductions is initially high, and 
remains high at higher emission prices because of the large potential for reductions through ITC 
and the considerable co-benefits. The same holds for Eastern Europe and Latin America, though 
the shares of non-CO2 gases are somewhat lower for these regions. For the EU-15, the USA and 
especially the Rest of the OECD, on the other hand, the share of non-CO2 gases in total 
reduction is modest and declines rapidly at higher cost levels. For these regions, the abatement 
options through ITC are limited, especially at higher emission prices. Firstly, the ‘low hanging 
fruit’ is already reaped in the baseline, as production in these developed countries is already 
relatively emission extensive for non-CO2 gases, so that the reduction potential is limited.   32 
Secondly, most of the non-CO2 emissions in these regions stem from sources for which there is 
no or only limited reduction potential to start with.  
Figure 4.3  Share of non-CO2 greenhouse gas emission reductions in the total reductions for different 
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4.2  Economic impacts of including non-CO2 gases 
In this section, we compare two cases. In the first case, we impose an emission target on all 
greenhouse gases, while climate policy is only directed at CO2. In the second case, the target is 
the same as in the first case, but now climate policy is aimed at CO2 as well as methane and 
nitrous oxide. This gives us an estimate for the gains from what-flexibility. We expect these 
gains to be positive, as a multi-gas strategy allows for a cost-minimising distribution of 
abatement efforts over CO2 and non-CO2 greenhouse gases.  
In Section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, we describe the regional and sectoral pattern when only CO2-
emissions are abated. In Section 4.2.3 and 4.2.4, we discuss the changes in these patterns when 
a multi-gas strategy is applied. In both cases, it is assumed that the Kyoto targets are 
implemented in all so-called Annex B countries (including the USA and Australia that have not 
ratified the Protocol) except for the former Soviet Union. The former Soviet Union is excluded 
as this country faces negative emission targets. This so-called ‘hot air’ would reduce overall 
costs and reduction levels greatly. The targets are applied to all countries simultaneously. 
Furthermore, we do not allow for emission trading, as we want to focus on the effect of 
including non-CO2 gases in the analysis. The focus is on the year 2010, which lies in the middle 
of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008- 2012).   33 
4.2.1  Abatement of CO2 only: regional effects
18 
Climate policy has a differential impact on the different regions. These regional effects of CO2 
abatement are shown in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1  Regional effects of CO2-only abatement in percentage change relative to baseline in 2010 
  CO2 emissions  Non-CO2 
emissions 
Marginal 




GDP per capita 
         
Germany  - 8.1  - 1.9  42.3  - 0.1 
France  - 7.7  - 0.6  57.9  - 0.1 
United Kingdom  - 13.4  - 3.4  77.2  - 0.3 
The Netherlands  - 14.1
 
- 3.6  84.9  - 0.5 
Belgium and Luxembourg  - 19.3  - 4.2  134.9  - 0.8 
Italy  - 10.6  - 1.5  84.3  - 0.4 
Spain  - 2.1  - 1.0  13.1   0.0 
Rest of Europe  - 7.3  - 0.4  46.6  - 0.2 
USA  - 18.9  - 8.6  67.6  - 0.2 
Rest OECD  - 8.6  - 2.1  38.3  - 0.1 
Eastern Europe  0.3  - 0.4  0.0  0.1 
Former Soviet Union
a  0.3  - 0.6  -  - 0.0 
Middle East and Northern Africa
a
  0.6  - 0.9  -  - 0.1 
Turkey
a
  0.4  - 0.1  -  0.1 
Latin America
a
  0.7  - 0.2  -  0.1 
Rest of World
a
  0.3  - 0.1  -  0.1 
          a
 Region without reduction commitment 
b
 Absolute change relative to baseline  
 
There is substantial regional variations in marginal abatement costs, with costs ranging from 0 
US$/tCeq in Eastern Europe to 134.9 US$/tCeq in Belgium and Luxemburg, implying that there 
is quite some scope for emission trading. Furthermore, we see that there are sizeable non-CO2 
co-benefits for some regions such as the USA, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and 
Belgium and Luxembourg, but smaller co-benefits in other regions. Finally, the fall in per 
capita GDP is only modest. GDP per capita even rises for some non-Annex B countries. Not 
surprisingly, the fall in GDP per capita is the largest for the countries with high marginal 
abatement costs. The main cause of the fall in per capita GDP in Annex B regions is the 
introduction of inefficiencies by the imposition of an emission tax. The inefficiencies are caused 
by sectoral restructuring which lowers overall productivity. 
GDP per capita also falls in some of the regions without reduction commitments, such as the 
Middle East and Northern Africa and the former Soviet Union. These regions are large 
exporters of fossil fuels, so that they are hurt by the fall in demand for fossil fuels resulting 
from the imposition of an emission tax in Annex B countries. The costs of climate policy are 
thus partly shifted to these regions. 
 
18 For a more elaborate analysis of the impact of CO2-only policy, see Bollen et al. (2002) and Bollen et al. (2001).   34 
However, there are also regions which benefit from climate policy, such as the WorldScan 
region “Rest of World”. As a result of an increase in the producer prices of energy intensive 
products in Annex B regions, the competitiveness of non-Annex B regions improves. The 
energy intensive sectors in these regions thus expand, leading to so-called carbon leakage: the 
emissions of CO2 in these regions increase, as can be seen in Table 4.1.  
4.2.2  Abatement of CO2 only: sectoral effects 
The sectoral effects of the imposition of an emission tax on CO2 emissions are presented in 
Table 4.2 for a selection of sectors and regions. 
The imposition of an emission tax leads to substitution between products and sectors. 
Firstly, within the class of energy carriers, energy carriers with high carbon content such as coal 
will be substituted for energy carriers with lower carbon content such as gas and petrol. Indeed 
we see in Table 4.2 that the coal sector generally loses most.  
Table 4.2  Sectoral effects of CO2 reductions (percentage change in value added relative to baseline in 
2010) 













             
Coal  - 23.3  - 30.5  - 33.0  - 1.1  - 4.0  - 1.7 
Oil products  - 4.0  - 5.1  - 17.6  0.5  1.7  1.1 
Gas  - 6.0  - 7.8  - 10.7  - 1.7  - 2.0  - 1.1 
Oil  - 8.8  - 4.0  - 15.0  - 2.1  - 3.4  - 6.3 
Electricity  - 3.0  - 0.8  - 8.9  0.4  0.3  0.2 
Energy intensive products  - 0.1  0.0  - 0.2  0.3  0.4  0.2 
Chemical products  - 0.1  - 0.0  - 0.7  0.5  0.7  0.4 
Transport  - 0.3  - 0.6  - 2.3  0.8  1.2  0.6 
Rice  - 1.0  - 1.1  - 1.0  0.4  0.8  0.2 
Livestock  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.7  0.1 
Rest agriculture  0.2  0.3  - 0.6  0.5  1.0  0.2 
Services  0.1  0.1  0.4  - 0.0  0.0  0.0 
             
Macro GDP  - 0.1  - 0.1  - 0.2  - 0.0  - 0.1  0.1 
              a
 Region without reduction commitment. 
 
Secondly, within a region, energy carriers will be substituted for other production factors or 
products. In production, energy carriers will be substituted for labour and capital, while 
consumption will shift from energy intensive products to services. Indeed the service sector and 
some agricultural sectors expand in Annex B regions, while the share of energy intensive 
sectors such as transport, chemical products and electricity declines in Annex B regions.  
Finally, there will be international substitution as the production of energy intensive goods will 
relocate to non-Annex B regions (carbon leakage), as Table 4.2 shows. The energy intensive 
sectors expand in these regions, and the fall in demand for energy carriers has less severe   35 
consequences for these regions than for the Annex B countries. The size of this latter effect 
depends on import and export taxes, substitution effects between foreign and domestic products 
and on transport costs. 
4.2.3  Multi-gas strategy: regional effects 
For the second simulation, the same targets are imposed as in the CO2-only variant discussed in 
Section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, but now climate policy is directed at carbon dioxide as well as at the 
non-CO2 greenhouse gases. The regional effects of a multi-gas strategy relative to a CO2-only 
policy are presented in Table 4.3. The additional reduction options from non-CO2 gases have 
several effects. Firstly, the fall in GDP per capita is generally lower than in the case of CO2-
only policy. Moreover, marginal abatement costs fall considerably in most regions. This reflects 
the availability of cheap abatement options for non-CO2 emissions. However, this decline varies 
across regions because of regional differences in the availability of abatement options.  
Table 4.3                Regional effects of a multi-gas strategy (percentage relative to CO2-only policy in 2010) 







GDP per capita 
         
Germany  1.9  - 15.8  - 12.0  0.0 
France  3.8  - 12.9  - 30.3  0.1 
United Kingdom  3.0  - 20.2  - 21.8  0.1 
The Netherlands  3.8  - 22.5  - 25.9  0.2 
Belgium and Luxembourg  2.1  - 18.1  - 19.1  0.1 
Italy  1.5  - 12.5  - 14.7  0.1 
Spain  1.0  - 5.0  - 6.2  0.0 
Rest of Europe  1.0  - 4.8  - 7.8  0.0 
USA  7.6  - 22.5  - 19.6  0.0 
Rest OECD  1.5  - 9.8  - 8.4  0.0 
Eastern Europe  - 0.1  0.6  0.0  - 0.1 
Former Soviet Union
a  - 0.1  0.5  -  0.0 
Middle East and Northern Africa
a
  - 0.1  0.8  -  0.0 
Turkey
a
  - 0.1  0.5  -  - 0.0 
Latin America
a
  - 0.1  0.3  -  0.0 
Rest of World
a
  - 0.0  0.2  -  - 0.0 
 
a
 Region without reduction commitment. 
b
 Change in level compared to the baseline 
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Thirdly, the required abatement targets for CO2 fall as a result of the availability of low-costs 
abatement options for the non-CO2 gases. In some cases, CO2-emissions are even allowed to 
rise relative to the CO2-only case. This effect is particularly important for the industrialised 
countries. In the industrialised countries, the share of non-CO2 gases in the total reduction 
volume is higher than their total emission share. This implies that CO2-emissions need not fall 
as much as in the CO2-only case. However, this effect is only important at moderate emission 
prices, since at higher abatement volumes, the low-cost abatement options for non-CO2 
emissions quickly become exhausted (see also Section 4.1 for an illustration of this point for the 
EU-15). All together, the Annex B regions benefit somewhat from the inclusion of non-CO2 
greenhouse gases. 
4.2.4  Multi-gas strategy: sectoral effects 
The sectoral effects for a selection of regions and sectors are presented in Table 4.4. Several 
effects play a role when climate policy is also directed at the non-CO2 greenhouse gases. 
Firstly, a larger part of the burden will fall on the agricultural sector than in the case of a CO2-
only policy. The imposition of an emission tax leads to a price increase in this sector. The price 
increase in turn leads to a fall in demand and hence to a lower production in Annex B regions. 
The demand for these products partly shifts to non-Annex B regions, and partly to other 
products. Indeed, the share of agricultural sectors in the Annex B countries is lower than in the 
CO2-only case.
19 Also the share of the gas sector in total value added is now reduced, for the 
same reason. In the non-Annex B regions, the share of agriculture and gas production is now 
higher as compared to the CO2-only policy.  
Secondly, the output price of energy sectors does not rise as much as in the CO2-only case, 
as part of the burden is now borne by sectors that produce non-CO2 gases. Table 4.4 shows that 
the share of oil products is now higher than in the CO2-only case. 
For the coal sector , both opposing effects play a role. While there is a negative effect on 
production due to the tax on non-CO2 related emissions, there is also a positive effect on 
production, as the tax on CO2-related emissions is now lower than in the case of a policy 
directed solely at CO2. 
 
19 This effect appears to be especially large for the rice sector. However, this is merely an artifact, as rice production is 
almost zero in the Annex B countries, so that small absolute fluctuations in the production volume give rise to a large relative 
effect.   37 
Table 4.4  Sectoral effects of a multi-gas strategy (percentage change in value added relative to CO2-only 
strategy in 2010) 













             
Coal  3.9  - 7.0  7.9  0.4  2.3  0.7 
Oil products  1.2  3.4  5.0  - 0.1  - 0.4  - 0.3 
Gas  - 6.5  - 10.0  - 2.0  1.0  1.4  1.1 
Oil  1.2  0.7  1.6  0.5  0.9  1.8 
Electricity  0.8  0.5  2.0  - 0.1  - 0.1  - 0.1 
Energy intensive products  0.1  0.1  0.1  - 0.1  - 0.1  - 0.1 
Chemical products  - 0.1  - 0.1  - 0.0  - 0.1  - 0.2  - 0.1 
Transport  0.1  0.6  0.7  - 0.3  - 0.4  - 0.2 
Rice  - 6.0  - 6.1  - 4.2  0.1  0.0  0.1 
Livestock  - 1.8  - 0.8  - 4.3  0.2  0.4  0.3 
Rest agriculture  - 0.5  - 0.6  - 1.1  0.1  0.0  0.1 
Services  - 0.0  - 0.0  - 0.1  0.0  - 0.0  - 0.0 
             
Macro GDP  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  - 0.0 
  a
 Region without reduction commitment. 
   38   39 
5  Conclusions 
In this paper, the WorldScan energy model is extended to include emissions from the non-CO2 
greenhouse gases methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O). These greenhouse gases are 
important for several reasons. Firstly, they account for 10 to 40% (depending on the region) of 
the greenhouse gas emissions in the so-called Kyoto-basket (weighted by the Global Warming 
Potential). Furthermore, some of the non-CO2 emission sources offer reduction options at low 
costs, suggesting that the gains from what-flexibility can be large. Moreover, the sectoral 
emission profile for methane and nitrous oxide is different from that of CO2, indicating that 
including non-CO2 greenhouse gases in the analyses may change the sectoral effects. The 
agricultural sector, for instance, is only a minor source of CO2, while it is an important source 
of both methane and nitrous oxide in many regions. Finally, regions differ in the availability of 
low cost reduction options for non-CO2 gases, so that the regional effects may also vary.  
Climate policy entails the introduction of a tax on emissions. Emissions from both CO2 and 
non-CO2 gases can be reduced by improving either the emission efficiency or by reducing the 
level of the activity responsible for the emissions (e.g. for CO2 gases the production volume of 
energy intensive goods). The modelling of emissions from non-CO2 gases differs from the 
modelling of emissions of CO2 in the sense that the many factors contributing to the emission 
efficiency are not modelled explicitly but are collected in a ‘catch-all’ factor, the emission 
factor. Reducing emissions by improving the emission efficiency comes at a cost of reduced 
productivity. For CO2, this means that the mix of energy inputs is changed compared to baseline 
towards energy inputs with lower CO2 emissions. For non-CO2 gases, this is not modelled 
explicitly, but is instead reflected in a decline in total factor productivity. A firm thus faces a 
trade-off between paying the emission tax and improving emission efficiency. The optimum is 
contained implicitly in bottom-up marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves showing the emission 
volume that can be reduced at a certain cost. However, general equilibrium effects and inter-gas 
interactions (the so-called ‘co-benefits’) are also important. By including bottom-up MAC-
curves into the applied general equilibrium model WorldScan, bottom-up information is 
combined with general equilibrium effects.  
General equilibrium marginal abatement cost curves can be derived from the model. These 
curves give a first indication of the importance of the different effects. In Section 4.1 it is shown 
that the importance of general equilibrium effects varies over regions. These differences can be 
explained by referring to the relative importance of the non-CO2 gases in total emissions in that 
region and the shape of the regional marginal abatement cost curves. For instance, for the 
former Soviet Union, there are many low cost reduction options available. In addition, there are 
considerable co-benefits. By contrast, for the EU-15 countries, the contribution of non-CO2 
gases to the full MAC-curve is only modest. The reason is that only a limited share of the non-
CO2 emissions in the EU stem from sources with a positive reduction potential, while many of   40 
the inexpensive abatement options are already exhausted in the baseline. Moreover, the co-
benefits are only small as a result of the sectoral composition of the emissions.  
For all regions, non-CO2 abatement lowers total abatement costs, although the size of the 
cost reduction varies across regions. For the former Soviet Union, the share of non-CO2 gases in 
total reductions is high even at higher emission prices as a result of the large potential for 
reductions through induced technological change and the considerable co-benefits. The same 
holds for Eastern Europe and Latin America, though the shares of non-CO2 gases are somewhat 
smaller in these regions. For the EU-15, the USA and the other OECD countries, on the other 
hand, the share of non-CO2 gases in the total reduction volume is modest and declines rapidly at 
higher prices. In general, the analysis shows that there is a limited role for non-CO2 gases at 
higher emission prices. At higher emission prices, low cost reduction options for non-CO2 gases 
are exhausted. All together, the regional effects on GDP per capita of including non-CO2 gases 
are limited. Marginal abatement costs fall, but the effect on GDP per capita is limited.  
At the sectoral level, there is an important shift in burden. In some regions, the share in 
value added of oil, coal and gas products is now higher than under a CO2-only policy. By 
contrast, the output share of agricultural sectors is reduced relative to a CO2-only policy. 
Several effects play a role. Firstly, the price increase for agricultural products due to emission 
taxes will result in a fall in demand and hence to lower production in Annex B regions. The 
demand for these products partly shifts to non-Annex B regions, and partly to other products. 
Secondly, the output price of energy sectors does not have to increase as much as in the CO2-
only case, as part of the burden is now borne by non-CO2 gases.  
Note that the sectoral effects of extending climate policy to non-CO2 greenhouse gases may 
be underestimated in this work, as it is assumed that the reduction potential in the livestock 
sector is zero as there are no data available. In reality, the reduction potential in this sector 
might be considerable, even though this potential may be hard to realise because of the 
dispersed nature of the emission sources. This is especially important for the analysis of the 
effects of climate policy in countries such as China and India that have a large agricultural 
sector. The gains of what-flexibility for those countries are potentially large, once the reduction 
potential in the livestock sector is taken into account.  
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Appendix A: Bottom-up MAC-curves and their 
parameterisation 
The bottom-up MAC-curves are fitted using Equation (3.4). This yields two parameters, δ and 
e , which are presented in the table below. The MAC-curves for the various emission sources 
are shown in the figures below.  
 
Table A.1        Fit of the parameter technical reduction limit ε for bottom-up MAC-curves 
   Paddy rice  Leakages coal  Leakages oil  Leakages gas  Adipic and nitric 
acid production 
           
Europe-15  0.57  0.52  1.00  0.49  0.92 
USA  0.57  0.88  0.21  0.56  0.92 
Rest OECD  0.57  0.76  0.29  0.55  0.92 
Eastern Europe  0.57  0.73  1.00  1.00  0.92 
Former Soviet Union  0.57  0.61  0.38  0.43  1.00 
Middle East  0.57  0.86  0.43  0.60  1.00 
Turkey  0.57  1.00  1.00  0.62  0.92 
Latin America  0.57  1.00  0.35  0.59  1.00 
Rest of World  0.57  0.80  0.32  0.53  0.92 
 
 
Table A.2        Fit of the parameter convergence speed δ for bottom-up MAC-curves 
   Paddy rice  Leakages coal  Leakages oil  Leakages gas  Adipic and nitric 
acid production 
           
Europe-15  23.2  0.1  5.5  10  0.05 
USA  23.2  5.1  12.2  139  0.05 
Rest OECD  23.2  2.2  13.2  132  0.05 
Eastern Europe  23.2  0.1  1.8  142  0.05 
Former Soviet Union  23.2  3.0  12.2  15  1.00 
Middle East  23.2  0.1  5.5  119  1.00 
Turkey  23.2  0.1  1.8  96  1.00 
Latin America  23.2  1.0  5.5  64  1.00 
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Figure A.4  Regional MAC-curves for emissions from losses and leakages from gas production and 
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Appendix B: Derivation of the productivity function 
The emission factor F E  is defined by:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) E ITC A E E
F
E
F P r r P r with P r E P r E + = - × = , 1 ,  (B.1) 
with 
F E the emission factor in the base year, and r the reduction as a function of the emission 
price PE. The reduction r is the sum of the reduction as a result of climate policy (rITC) and the 
autonomous reduction in the baseline (rA).  
Assuming that emissions are taxed at production Q , the profit of the firmP  becomes: 
( ) Q r E P Q c Q A p F
E × - × - × - × × = P 1 ,  (B.2)  
where p is the producer price, and c is the marginal cost of production excluding abatement. 
The productivity A  is a decreasing and concave function of the emission reduction r : the more 
resources are diverted to abatement, the less output is available for sale. The first order 
condition for the optimal reduction reads: 
0 ' = × + × × =
¶
P ¶
Q E P Q A p
r
F
E   (B.3)  
We assume zero profits. The firm chooses the optimal abatement level given an emission 
response function PE(r). We assume that the emission response function takes the following 
form: 












E for         (B.4) 
with rA the reduction through AEEI, ε denoting the technical limit to the possible emission 
reduction, and δ the speed of convergence . Abatement efforts affect the productivity A of a 
sector. The effect of productivity on profit defines an optimal abatement level. The two key 
equations are the zero-profit condition and the first order condition for the optimal reduction 
levels. At the optimal abatement level r , and thus also for  ITC r  because  A r  is a constant, it 
holds that: 
( ) Q r E P Q c Q A p F
E × - × - × - × × = 1 0   (B.5) 
Q E P Q A p F
E × + × × = ' 0   (B.6) 
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Substitution (B.4) into this differential equation and integrating over rITC, we get: 












2 ln   (B.8) 
with  
d f F E = ,    c rA - - = ) 1 ( f l ,    ) ( A r c - = e m  
and ￿ a constant of integration. Solving this integral yields: 
































r r r A   (B.9)    
with the constant of integration ￿ following from the constraint A(0) = 1. After some rewriting 
and simplification, this leads to the Equation (3.5) from the main text.    
 
 
 